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Abstract
This paper adapts a framework a`-la Hotelling to an urban context in order to
study the impact of public housing on the level of segregation in a fixed-size city
where consumers differ both in income and taste. In this city, the market allocation
of the population is characterized by partial segregation: both rich and poor con-
sumers can be found in both neighborhoods. Public authorities replace a fraction
of the housing stock with public housing. This policy will not decrease segregation
if applicants are not screened according to their income level. Any departure from
the optimal level of screening has to be compensated for by a larger program. The
final policy mix will then be determined by the extent to which public authorities
have the ability, either to screen applicants, or to fund more public units. However,
this trade-off will be softened when taking neighborhood externalities into account,
thanks to a snowball effect of public housing on neighborhood quality.
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Keywords: public housing, segregation, sorting, Hotelling, rationing.
∗This paper has benefited from discussions with various seminar and conference participants, and
especially Cle´ment Bosquet, Alexandre de Cornie`re, Romain de Nijs, Pierre-Philippe Combes, Robert
Gary-Bobo, Laurent Gobillon, Nicolas Schultz, Alain Trannoy, Thomas Tregoue¨t, Tanguy van Ypersele
and Bertrand Villeneuve. The usual caveat applies.
†Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS, Georgetown Univer-
sity, http://sites.google.com/site/benoitschmutz
Introduction
In this paper, I use a framework a` la Hotelling to show that public housing policies
aiming at reducing socioeconomic stratification through rent control may only succeed
if the allocation of public housing units is not social-blind, but rather favors applicants
whose kind is under-represented in the neighborhood. Without screening, and if total
housing supply is fixed, public housing has no impact on overall housing affordabil-
ity because it also increases prices in the private units nearby. If, for external reasons,
the city-planner does not set the screening rule herself, her only instrument left is the
size of the program: in that case, the lower the screening, the higher the minimum pro-
gram size required to reduce segregation. A simple condition on the respective sizes of
the two neighborhoods and the two groups of consumers will then determine in which
neighborhood the program will be implemented. Finally, the introduction of neighbor-
hood externalities in the form of peer effects does not alter the message of the model.
On the contrary, the public housing policy is better at addressing segregation in this
context, because its indirect impact on neighborhood valuation mitigates the polarizing
trends at work in the city.
In 2000 the Law ”Solidarite´ et Renouvellement Urbains” (SRU) is established in
France. It states that most municipalities must progressively reach 20% of public hous-
ing (Habitations a` Loyers Mode´re´s, HLM) in their total stock, under the threat of finan-
cial sanctions. The main goal of the SRU law is to address urban economic segregation.
The rationale behind such regulation by quota is that public housing is an efficient tool
against economic segregation, provided the following two conditions are met: first, the
municipal scale is relevant to ensure that public housing units are scattered enough
between and within metropolitan areas; second, the rent gradient according to neigh-
borhood quality must be less steep on the public housing market. While this double
assumption is not unrealistic, it is not sufficient to ensure that public housing will re-
duce segregation. In a context of very high eligibility thresholds (in France, according
to Wasmer in Mistral and Plagnol (2009), four fifths of the population are eligible), the
result will crucially depend on the characteristics of the matching process between ap-
plicants and vacancies. Indeed, an increase in the quality of the public housing supply
is quite likely to increase entry, hence competition, at the expense of the lowest types of
applicants. More generally, this kind of reasoning neglects general equilibrium effects
of a change in the public housing supply on the level of rents in the private housing
market as well as on neighborhood characteristics, through externalities. The purpose
of this paper is to study the following dilemma: anti-segregation public housing policies
may not be able to contribute to vertical equity at the same time; they suffer from being a
single instrument with two conflicting objectives, namely an increase in overall housing
affordability and a decrease in segregation. This is all the more embarrassing that place-
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based policies are currently under siege (Sarpca, Leung, and Yilmaz (2010)), whereas the
most compelling argument in their favor is maybe that, thanks to their somewhat more
rigid design, they are more efficient against economic segregation, which often emerges
as the market outcome when people are free to move.
The model presented here is not an urban economic model per se: for the intro-
duction of rent control into an urban economic model, see Heffley (1998), which how-
ever does not focus on segregation issues. Here, the core of the model is a market a`-la
Hotelling with fixed housing supply and where agents consume one housing unit. The
market is both vertically and horizontally differentiated. There are two types of agents,
who differ in terms of price sensitivity. Any asymmetric equilibrium yields an alloca-
tion of the population which is characterized by incomplete sorting: members of both
groups will be found in both neighborhoods. Until recently, partial income stratifica-
tion was seldom a result obtained by economic modelling (Moretti (2011)). Two note-
worthy exceptions were Epple and Platt (1998) and Schmidheiny (2006), who present
models where households, who both differ in income and preferences, vote on the tax-
expenditure package the community will provide. The former focuses on property taxes
and aims at describing the US, whereas the latter, which aims at describing Switzerland,
focuses on local income taxes. These two papers are very efficient at explaining incom-
plete income stratification and the variability in local public good provision. However,
I choose here an alternative modelling strategy, for two reasons: first, the local public
good approach is not fully relevant in the case of public housing, which is a very specific
public good in that it directly impacts people’s location and it is generally not funded at
the local level; second, whereas the authors’ richer framework compels them to resort
to numerical simulations, the intent of this paper is to study the equilibrium properties
of the model from a fully analytical viewpoint.
Public authorities introduce public housing in the city, the price of which is fixed
exogenously below market prices. This leads to rationing because everybody is eligi-
ble and anyone who lives in one neighborhood unambiguously prefers to live in public
housing in the same neighborhood. I consider two allocation processes, which differ
according to whether people locate before or after the lottery. Both processes are rel-
evant, depending on the geographical scale of the location choice: the first one deals
with a larger scale, such as the metropolitan area, whereas the second one applies to
the choice between two neighborhoods which would be close to each other. I mostly
focus on the case when neighborhood quality is exogenous, city size is fixed and public
housing is made of preexisting stock which is preempted by public authorities. I show
that if both types of applicants are as likely to be selected (random allocation), the policy
has strictly no impact on the allocation of the population because its direct impact on
affordability is exactly counterbalanced by its indirect effect on private market prices.
Namely, the introduction of public housing in the more (resp., less) expensive neigh-
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borhood will unambiguously increase (resp., decrease) the price differential between
the two neighborhoods. In order to succeed in changing the allocation of the popula-
tion, one has to implement unequal treatment of the two types of applicants. To achieve
a predetermined reduction in the level of segregation, there is a trade-off between the
level of screening and the size of the public housing program. In particular, there is a
minimum level of screening that public housing authorities have to maintain in order
to minimize the total cost of the public housing program.
I discuss a first extension where I describe what happens when, due to externalities,
the quality of a neighborhood also depends on its social make-up. Whereas a random
allocation of public housing still cannot reduce segregation in this case, the screening of
applicants now has snowball effects on neighborhood quality, which loosen the trade-
off between the level of screening in the allocation process and the size of the public
housing program. Finally, I relax the assumption that public housing units are as de-
sirable as private ones and I introduce the notion of indirect screening whereby house-
holds decide whether to enroll or not in the program depending on the quality gap
between the two segments. In this case, the quality of public housing becomes a policy
parameter, which can be used to improve the targeting of the program. I provide an
equivalence relationship between indirect and direct screening in terms of segregation
and I discuss the respective relevance of these two mechanisms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 1, I introduce the baseline
model of the private market and I describe the allocation of public housing. Section 2
discusses the impact of public housing programs when neighborhood quality is taken
as given and is the same across the public/private border; Section 3 describes what
happens when either of these two assumptions is relaxed and Section 4 concludes.
1 The framework
1.1 Set-up
I consider a city of population normalized to 1 with two neighborhoods j = 0, 1
of fixed size n0 ≡ n and n1 ≡ 1 − n respectively.1 Neighborhoods differ in quality qj
and price pj . In the baseline case, I assume that qj is exogenous, whereas pj is always
determined at equilibrium. Housing is supplied by an absentee construction sector
facing a unit cost c. A necessary condition for the city to be built is
∑
j=0,1 njpj ≥ c.2
1As opposed to what is generally assumed in the industrial organization literature, there are capacity
constraints: supply is here fixed to a limit given by exogenous factors, such as land availability.
2This modelisation of the supply side of the market is made as simple as possible and will not play a
large role. Without it, the model would be written in differential terms (only the price differential would
be determined at equilibrium) but would lead to the same conclusions.
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The city is filled by a population of size 1. Consumers differ along two dimen-
sions: (i) their type i = H,L (for high/low income) with αi the proportion of type i
in the economy (αH ≡ α); (ii) an idiosyncratic term of heterogeneity x uniformly dis-
tributed on a segment [0; 1] of unit density. Therefore, the market exhibits both verti-
cal differentiation (group-average valuation qj) and horizontal differentiation (disper-
sion of individual preferences x). An interpretation of these two dimensions could be
that vertical differentiation relates to an universally orderable neighborhood character-
istic, such as sun exposure or air pollution, whereas horizontal differentiation relates
to a binary set of non-orderable neighborhood characteristics, such as the presence of
gardens in one neighborhood and movie theaters in the other. The “taste parameter”
t gives the relative weight of heterogeneity in individual preferences. Everyone con-
sumes one unit of housing and pays pj . The two types of consumers have a different
coefficient of disutility βi with respect to pj . Indirect utility functions are defined by
∀ {i, j, x} ∈ {H,L} × {0, 1} × [0; 1],
U ij (x) = qj − βipj − t |x− j| (1)
Following Tirole (1988), βi may be interpreted as an approximation of the marginal rate
of substitution between income and quality. If I assume that 0 < βH < βL, this means
that type-H consumers are wealthier than type-L. I note βˆ =
∑
i=H,L αiβ
i the average
value of βi in the economy. As for the term −t |x− j| , it gives the cost of having to
choose between the two options given by the horizontal dimension of neighborhood
differentiation, when a consumer x would in fact prefer benefiting from a combination
of these two options.3
For simplicity, I assume that the market is always covered: no consumer is better-off
refusing to participate in the housing market. In Appendix A.1, I provide a sufficient
condition for the market to be covered, which states that the expected utility of the
median type-L consumer with an equal probability to live in either neighborhood, must
be greater than its reservation utility. This assumption is not costly when qj is exogenous
and may be chosen as high as necessary.
Let xi (p0, p1) denote the type-i indifferent consumer between two neighborhoods,
i.e. such that U i0 (xi (p0, p1)) = U i1 (xi (p0, p1)). All the results will be written as a function
of 0, in order to indicate that no public housing unit is funded for now. Later, results will
be written as a function of sj , the size of the public housing program in neighborhood
j. The equilibrium is given by (p∗0 (0) , p∗1 (0)) , solution to the system formed by the
market-clearing equation (2) and the investors’ free-entry condition (3):
3 A more classical interpretation would be to consider that x gives the location of the consumer’s job.
If so, −t |x− j| becomes commuting costs. However, this is less relevant in this model without real labor
market.
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n =
∑
i=H,L
αix
∗
i (0) (2)
c =
∑
j=0,1
njp
∗
j (0) (3)
with x∗i (0) = xi (p∗0 (0) , p∗1 (0)). This yields the following equilibrium prices:
p∗j (0) = c+ (1− nj) [qj − q−j + t (1− 2nj)] /βˆ (4)
Straightforward comparative statics derived from equation 4 allow to write the follow-
ing proposition:
Proposition 1 The price differential between the two neighborhoods: (i) always increases with
the quality differential between the two neighborhoods, the proportion of type-H consumers in
the economy, and the level of income differentiation between the two types of consumers; (ii)
increases with the size of the larger neighborhood and with the weight of individual heterogeneity
if and only if the better-quality neighborhood is also the smaller.
The first three effects are straightforward, whereas the last two derive from the fact
that there is substitutability between neighborhood quality and size: both features make
the neighborhood more attractive, hence more expensive in relative terms. In this re-
spect, different equilibria should be distinguished: in the “symmetric” kind, prices are
the same in both neighborhoods; however, this may either be due to the fact that both
neighborhoods are perfectly identical, or that their features compensate each other; con-
versely, the equilibrium is “asymmetric” if prices are different in the two neighbor-
hoods, and it is “fully asymmetric” if both features go in the same direction, i.e. the
better quality neighborhood is also the smaller. In the rest of the paper, I choose to fo-
cus on this latter class of cities, for two reasons: first, it is more realistic to assume that
the better-quality good is also the relatively scarce resource; second, the possibility of
a trade-off between neighborhood quality and size would blur the mechanisms behind
the impact of public housing in a not very relevant manner.
Without loss of generality, I will assume that ∆q ≡ q0 − q1 > 0 and n < 1/2. In the
private market case, these assumptions are compatible with a fully asymmetric city in
favor of neighborhood 0.
1.2 Segregation and welfare in the private city
Segregation – I consider a simple segregation indicator: the dissimilarity index D,
which gives the mass of people who would need to swap neighborhoods for the city to
be perfectly integrated. It is the sum of two equal quantities: the excess of type-H in 0
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and the excess of type-L in 1: D(0) = α(x∗H(0)−n)+(1−α)(n−x∗L(0)). In this framework,
segregation is partial: both types of consumers are observed in both neighborhoods, as
opposed to total segregation, where one group of consumers is confined to one single
neighborhood. In analytical terms, this means that for both i = H,L, x∗i (0) ∈ (0, 1).
The upper bound of D will then be given by the size of the smaller of the two groups
of consumers: D ≤ mini {αi}. After simplification, one can show that D(0) is a simple
linear increasing function of ∆p∗01 (0), given by:
D (0) = α (1− α) (βL − βH)∆p∗01 (0) /t (5)
and straightforward comparative statics yield the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The level of segregation (i) increases with the quality differential between the
two neighborhoods and the level of income differentiation between the two types of consumers;
(ii) decreases with the size of the better-quality neighborhood and the weight of individual het-
erogeneity; (iii) increases then decreases with the proportion of type-H consumers.
The gap between consumer’s type as well as the relative attractiveness and scarcity
of neighborhood 0 tend to increase segregation, as opposed to horizontal differentiation,
which tends to reduce it. As far as α, its effect stems from the way segregation is mea-
sured by the dissimilarity index, which requires both groups to be large: this is easily
understood when one considers total segregation, with D (0) = mini {αi}. Segregation
is maximal when α = 1−
√
βH/(
√
βL +
√
βH).
Welfare – In this city without production, welfare W is confounded with consumer
surplus and is equal to the average utility level in the city. We have:
W =
∑
i=H,L
αi
(∫ x∗i
0
U i0 (x) dx+
∫ 1
x∗i
U i1 (x) dx
)
(6)
This expression can also be written as W = q¯ − p¯ − t¯, where q¯ is the average neighbor-
hood quality in the city, p¯ is the average price component of utility and t¯ is the average
taste component of utility. LetW (0) the level of welfare in the private city. For the corre-
sponding expressions of q¯, p¯ and t¯, see Appendix A.2. As one could expect, the function
W (0) exhibits the following properties:
Proposition 3 Welfare increases with neighborhood quality and decreases with construction
cost and the weight of individual heterogeneity.
The impact of the other parameters on total welfare is ambiguous. However, this is
no longer the case if the analysis is broken between the two groups of consumers. Let
Wi(0) the average utility of a type-i consumer, such that W (0) =
∑
i=H,L αiWi(0).
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Proposition 4 (i) The group of type-H consumers benefits from type-L consumers being poorer,
whereas the group of type-L consumers benefits from type-H consumers being richer; (ii) Each
group of consumers benefits from being a smaller share of the city population; (iii) whereas the
group of type-H consumers benefits from an increase in the size of the better-quality neighbor-
hood, the group of type-L consumers benefits from such an increase if and only if the group of
type-H consumers is not too large.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
These last results call for some remarks. The mechanism behind the respective im-
pact of βH and βL is twofold. First, the impact of βi on Wi (0) is ambiguous, whereas
the impact of βi on W−i (0) is not. This comes from the fact that βi impacts type-i con-
sumers’ utility both directly and indirectly (through the price and the taste components)
while it impacts type-(−i) consumers’ utility only indirectly. Second, there also are dif-
ferences between the two types of consumers: type-H benefit from type-L facing a larger
βL whereas type-L suffer from type-H facing a larger βH . In other words, the external-
ity of one group’s wealth on the other group’s welfare is asymmetric: beneficial for the
rich and detrimental for the poor. The reason is the following: Equation (4) shows that
any increase in βi yields a decrease in p∗0 (0) and an increase in p∗1 (0). Both phenomena
affect both groups of consumers, but since type-H consumers are over-represented in
neighborhood 0, the decrease in p∗0 (0) overcomes the increase in p∗1 (0) whereas the con-
trary happens for type-L consumers. The mechanisms behind the respective impact of
α and n are similar. The impact of α may be interpreted as a within-group competition
effect. As far as the impact of n, it may be interpreted as a between-group competition
effect: for type-H consumers, who are over-represented in neighborhood 0, an increase
in n always benefits enough people to overcome the negative impact of this increase on
those who still live in neighborhood 1. For type-L consumers, however, this will be the
case if and only if a sufficient fraction of them live in neighborhood 0, a condition which
will be met if an only if α < (βL − βH)/βˆ.
1.3 Public housing policy
Reducing segregation at the expense of welfare – The planner’s only goal is to reduce
segregation. This goal is pursued at the expense of the welfare of the population in
this model. In Appendix A.3, I show that the first-best allocation of the population is
achieved for total segregation. Moreover, one can show that the differential between
the level of welfare of a population living in a city with no segregation and the level of
welfare of a population living in the private city is an increasing function of the level
of market-driven segregation D(0): Let WNo = q¯ − βˆc − t [1/2− n (1− n)] denote the
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welfare of the population in the absence of segregation. This level of welfare verifies
W (0)−WNo = t× [D(0)]2/4α (1− α).
The assumption that the planner only cares about reducing segregation is normative
in the sense that it is drawn from outside of the model. There is a comprehensive body
of literature on the impact of socioeconomic stratification on growth, stemming from
Benabou (1996) and Epple and Romano (1998), which involves strategic complementar-
ities or external effects. However, these mechanisms are not included here. Providing a
micro-funded rationale of the planner’s goal is beyond the scope of this paper. The fact
that public authorities seek to reduce socioeconomic segregation through public hous-
ing programs is a political reality in many countries. While taking this political reality as
granted, the purpose of this paper is to question the ability of these programs to achieve
such a goal.
The planner’s program – City size is fixed.4 The planner may only decide whether
to buy a fraction sj of pre-existing housing in j at price pj , sj < nj , which will be
allocated to applicants after a lottery. The price of public housing is equal to k ≤
min {p∗0 (sj) ; p∗1 (sj)} and is the same in both neighborhoods.5 There is no use in funding
public housing in both neighborhoods at the same time in this static framework. For
this reason, the city planner simultaneously selects one neighborhood in which to fund
public housing and sets the size of the program. The program can be written as follows:
min
j=0,1
{
min
sj∈[0;nj ]
D (sj) s.t. sj
(
p∗j (sj)− k
) ≤ G} (7)
where D(sj) is the level of segregation in the city once the program sj has been im-
plemented. Optimal neighborhood choice derives from the comparison between the
two potential outcomes of s0 and s1. In Section 2, I will first describe the impact of
sj on D (sj) for a given G before discussing optimal neighborhood choice with a cost-
minimization criterion.
Note that I assume that k is exogenously determined, as well as public resources G.
One may want G to be endogenized, for example through a tax on consumers’ income.
However, such feature is not easy to include into a framework a` la Hotelling, where
incomes are not modeled explicitly: indeed, taxing income would here increase βH and
βL in a non-trivial way. Moreover, assuming this technical difficulty is solved, such
tax would by itself have an impact on segregation, because it would affect the level of
4It may seem surprising to consider that a public housing policy has no impact on city size, but this is
relevant in a context of very constrained supply, such as central cities of the largest metropolitan areas in
France. In addition, this assumption has been empirically verified in some US settings. For instance, Erik-
sen and Rosenthal (2010)) document a 100% crowd-out effect of public housing construction on private
construction.
5Note that this condition on the price of public housing yields more restrictions on the maximum size
of the program, which is in fact given by nj{1− nj [∆q + t(1− 2n)]/[βˆ(c− k)]}.
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vertical differentiation between consumers, unless strong assumptions are made on the
relationship between βi and the taxation rate. The impact of the program on segregation
would then be twofold, which would make the interpretation of the specific impact of
public housing on segregation more difficult. This partial equilibrium framework may
be easier to justify in countries where the financing of public housing program is highly
centralized: this is clearly the case of France, in sharp contrast with the US (Laferre`re
and LeBlanc (2006)).
Allocation rules – Public housing is rationed, because public housing units only dif-
fer from private ones with respect to their lower price. I now describe the allocation
rules which can be used to address this rationing problem. Consider that the planner
decides to fund public housing in neighborhood j: sj > 0 and s−j = 0. Let Prij the
probability that a type-i applicant to public housing in j receives an offer. If there are Aj
applicants to public housing in j, this probability is defined by a function fi such that
Prij = fi(sj/Aj), with f ′i > 0. In addition to sj , the government can then choose the level
of screening in the allocation of the program by fixing a set of functions (fi (.) , f−i (.))
which will ensure that all public housing units are allocated eventually.
I consider two allocation processes λ = a, p. The ex ante allocation process a means
that everybody chooses location before the lottery takes place. It is relevant when one
considers that the level of public housing supply has a magnetic effect on location deci-
sions between metropolitan areas (Verdugo (2011)) or if people need to be already living
in the local area in order to be allowed to apply. Under the ex post allocation process
p, people are allowed to relocate in another neighborhood after the result of the lottery.
It is relevant when one considers location decisions at a smaller geographical scale, for
example between the different jurisdictions of the same metropolitan area.
Ex ante allocation is easily tractable because it takes Aj = nj as exogenous. Let p˜j the
stochastic price paid for a housing unit in j. Agents choose where to locate according
to their expected utility in each neighborhood, which depends on the probabilities of
the lottery Prij, with Eip˜j(sj) = Pr
i
j k + (1 − Prij)pj < pj and Eip˜j(s−j) = p−j . Let
xi(E
ip˜0(sj);E
ip˜1(sj)) denote a type-i indifferent consumer between a lottery on housing
in j and private housing in −j. The equilibrium is given by (pa0(sj), pa1(sj)), solution to
a system formed by a new market-clearing equation and a new free-entry condition.
Expressions of the corresponding equations (32) and (33) are given in Appendix A.4).
Investors fully anticipate the impact of the public housing program on prices and the
free-entry condition changes accordingly.
The problem of ex ante location choice is that it forces a fraction of consumers who
would be better off moving after the lottery to stay in place. The second allocation pro-
cess takes this issue into account. Agents move according to the result of the lottery. Let
xi(k; p1(s0)) (resp., xi(p0(s1); k)) denote the type-i indifferent consumer between public
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housing in 0 (resp., 1) and private housing in 1 (resp., 0) and xi(p0(sj); p0(sj)) the type-i
indifferent consumer between private housing in 0 and private housing in 1. The size
of the two potential groups of applicants is now given by A0 =
∑
i=H,L αixi(k; p1(s0))
and A1 =
∑
i=H,L αi[1 − xi(p0(s1); k)]. The equilibrium is given by (pp0(sj), pp1(sj)), solu-
tion to a new system formed by the same free-entry condition (33) as before and new
market-clearing equations (34) if j = 0 or (35) if j = 1 (for expressions, see Appendix
A.4).
2 Public housing under exogenous neighborhood quality
2.1 Random allocation of public housing
I first consider that public housing is randomly allocated across types: ∀i ∈ (H,L) ,
fi = Id. If public housing is funded in neighborhood j, the price differential, defined by
∆pλγ (sj) = p
λ
γ (sj)− p∗γ (0), gives the impact of public housing on private prices in neigh-
borhood γ ∈ {j;−j}. It can be shown that this differential is positive in neighborhood
j and negative in neighborhood (−j). This is the case for both allocation processes. (for
proof, see Appendix A.5.1 and A.5.2. The impact of public housing on private market
prices may then be summarized as follows:
Proposition 5 The introduction of public housing in one neighborhood increases the private
market price in this neighborhood and decreases the private market price in the other neighbor-
hood.
This effect of public housing on prices comes directly from the fact that supply is
fixed and there are no externalities of public housing on the private market. The intro-
duction of public housing in j reduces private housing supply in j, which raises prices,
whereas it makes neighborhood (−j) less attractive. Whereas it may seem counterintu-
itive, this positive effect of public housing on prices nearby is relatively consistent with
US evidence. For instance, Baum-Snow and Marion (2009) document a positive impact
of low income tax housing credit developments on housing prices in declining areas
(and no impact elsewhere). On the Parisian housing market, Goujard (2011) also finds
evidence of a positive impact of public housing on the price of private units located very
close-by.
The previous price mechanism leads to the following fundamental result:
Proposition 6 If public housing is randomly allocated between household types, the impact of
public housing on private market prices will perfectly counterbalance the increase in affordability
for elected households. As a result, segregation will stay unchanged at the neighborhood level.
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Proof: see Appendix A.5.3.
Proposition 6 is the central result of this model. If everyone is eligible, the random
allocation of public housing will not impact segregation at the neighborhood level, de-
spite the direct effect of public housing, i.e., the provision of a stock of housing units
below market rents. This calls for some remarks. First, the fact that the indirect price
effect goes in the opposite direction to the direct effect of public housing is driven by a
pure supply effect on the private market. Second, the fact that both compensate each
other perfectly is due to the equilibrium conditions of the model (fixed supply in each
neighborhood, fixed number of consumers and a covered-market assumption): because
of these conditions, expected prices are kept constant in the ex ante allocation case and
private prices adjust completely in the ex post allocation case. Finally, whereas both al-
location processes yield the same between-neighborhood allocation of the population,
they differ when considering their impact on the allocation between private and pub-
lic units within the neighborhood. Under ex post allocation, while the proportion of
type-L consumers increases in public housing because of their greater price sensitivity,
it decreases in the private units of the neighborhood because of the increase in private
prices and both mechanisms perfectly compensate each other. On the contrary, under
ex ante allocation, the shares of type-H and type-L consumers also remain exactly the
same across the private/public boundary.
Since the impact of randomly-allocated public housing is the same on segregation
at the neighborhood level through both allocation processes, I will focus on ex ante
allocation (and drop the superscript a) in the rest of the paper. This choice is motivated
by the need to keep the analytical results easily interpretable. However, as stated above,
both allocations processes are not equivalent and such restriction does come at a cost.
2.2 Screening
I now introduce the possibility for the public housing agency to screen applicants
with respect to their type. The allocation of public housing can be made type-dependent,
in order to reduce segregation. For a public housing program sj , screening is defined by
the vector φj = (φHj , φLj ) 6= (1, 1) such that fi (sj/Aj) = φijsj/Aj . This setting enables me
to describe the link between the minimum size of the public housing program and the
minimum level of screening that must be implemented to reduce market-driven segre-
gation by a given factor δ. If the planner could more easily play on the level of screening
because program size sj is fixed exogenously (lack of public resources, limited capac-
ity of eviction, etc.), this setting would give the minimum level of screening that will
have to be implemented to reduce the level of segregation by a factor δ. Reciprocally, if
screening φj is fixed exogenously, it will give the minimum program size sj that needs
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to be funded in order to reduce the level of segregation by a given factor δ. The two
problems are analytically equivalent. Since many political and technical constraints are
likely to impede the screening of applicants, I choose to present the latter.
Consider that one of the two weights φ−ij is fixed: it gives the level of acceptance of
type-−i applicants in public housing funded in neighborhood j. The two unknowns
of the problem are sj and φij . The two solutions, denoted sj(φ
−i
j ) and φ
i
j(φ
−i
j ), give the
minimum size of the public housing program that is needed to reach the goal δ and the
extent to which type-(−i) applicants will be favored along the way, under the political
constraint φ−ij . Again, type-i agents choose where to locate according to expected prices
Eip˜j(sj) = (φ
i
jsj/nj)k + (1 − φijsj/nj)pj and Eip˜j(s−j) = p−j . The type-i indifferent
consumer between a lottery on housing in j and private housing in −j is now denoted
xi(E
ip˜0(sj, φ
i
j);E
ip˜1(sj, φ
i
j]). The objective function is given by Equation (8):
D
(
sj, φ
i
j
)
= (1− δ)D (0) (8)
which is solved under a similar system as before and a new constraint, which stipulates
that no public housing unit should remain vacant at the end of the allocation process.
The solutions to this system enable me to write the following proposition:
Proposition 7 (i) Under screening, one type of applicant is always favored at the expense of the
other. (ii) There is a possibility of substitution between the level of screening and the size of the
public housing program, (iii) but there is a minimum level of screening below which the planner
will not be able to reduce segregation.
Proof: see Appendix A.6.2
If public housing is funded in the better (resp., worse) neighborhood, then type-
L (resp., type-H) applicants must be favored at the expense of type-H (resp., type-L)
for public housing to reduce segregation. Conversely, a planner wishing to reduce the
level of screening in the allocation of public housing while keeping the same goal in
terms of segregation will have to compensate by increasing the size of the public hous-
ing program. However, since neighborhood size is fixed, this trade-off does not allow
for perfectly random allocation. A minimum level of screening needs to be enforced,
which corresponds to the situation where the whole neighborhood needs to be trans-
formed into public housing. Let φHmax0 and φLmax1 the weights such that s0(φHmax0 ) = n
and s1(φLmax1 ) = 1 − n. From now on, I will consider that this condition is met, ie,
φH0 ≤ φHmax0 and φL1 ≤ φLmax1 . Finally, the new level of segregation D∗(φij, G) is equal to
(1 − δ∗(φij, G))D(0), where δ∗(φij, G) = min {δsup(G), 1} is obtained by solving equation
sj(φ
i
j)pj(sj(φ
i
j)) = G in δ. This equation admits a unique positive solution δsup(G). If
the planner’s resources are above a threshold Gmax, then δsup(G) > 1. (for proof, see
Appendix A.7).
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I develop a numerical example of the impact of screening when public housing is
funded in the better neighborhood. It shows how much of the neighborhood must be
turned into public housing to achieve a reduction of the level of market-driven segrega-
tion by a given factor δ. The values of the model parameters are given in Table 1. These
values were simply selected in order to meet the parametric conditions that have been
assumed so far and they do not relate to real-life values in a simple way. They yield
the following equilibrium: p∗0(0) = 3.7, p∗1(0) = 2.5, x∗H(0) = 0.69, x
∗
L(0) = 0.16. The
value of the dissimilarity index is D(0) = 0.26, meaning that under the free market al-
location, a quarter of the population would have to move to the other neighborhood to
achieve perfect integration. The value of total welfare isW (0) = 3.7, a weighted average
between WH(0) = 5.2 and WL(0) = 2.5.
Table 1: Parameter values
βL βH q0 q1 α n t c k
1 0.1 6 5.5 0.45 0.4 1 3 0
Figure 1 illustrates the property of substitutability between the level of screening in
the allocation of public housing and the size of the public housing program. For any
goal δ, moving to the right of the graph, which means increasing the access to public
housing for type-H applicants, has to be compensated by funding more public housing
units, in the limit fixed by the size of the neighborhood. As a consequence, very low
levels of screening (ie, high values of ϕH0 ) may be out of reach. Finally, one can see that
if the planner only seeks a modest decrease in segregation, the substitution effect will
only be large for very low levels of screening: the higher the goal in terms of reducing
segregation, the more needed the screening. The conclusions are the same if public
housing is funded in neighborhood 1, except that the goal δ = 1 is out of reach for any
value of ϕL1 (see Figure 5 in Appendix C).
Figure 2 gives the corresponding minimum reachable level of segregation D∗(φij, G)
as a function of φij , for different values of G . The new level of segregation is equal to
D (0) for G = 0 or φH0 = 1 (represented by the dotted line in Figure 2): while completely
random allocation remains incompatible with any decrease in segregation, a planner
wishing to implement as little screening as possible may always marginally substitute
screening with more public housing, but at an increasing marginal cost. Finally, when
public housing is funded in neighborhood 0, as soon as G > Gˆ0 ≈ 1.35, there is a mini-
mum value of φH0 under which the program is saturated, meaning that public resources
are too abundant. The conclusions are the same if public housing is funded in neigh-
borhood 1, except that Gˆ1 ≈ 1.7 (see Figure 6 in Appendix C).
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Figure 1: Optimal public housing share in neighborhood 0 as a function of the level of
acceptance of type-H applicants
Figure 2: Optimal level of segregation when public housing funded in neighborhood 0
as a function of the level of acceptance of type-H applicants
2.3 The planner’s choice
I now come back to the planner’s program. If the planner, for external reasons, is
facing a fixed level of public rents k and a fixed screening process, its only instrument
left is the choice of the neighborhood in which public housing should be funded. Under
no other constraint, the factor behind the choice of one neighborhood over the other
will be the cost of the program, given by the number of public housing times the rent
differential between private rent in the neighborhood and k. Whereas this differential
is larger in neighborhood 0, it may well be the case that this effect is overcome by the
need to fund more units in neighborhood 1 in order to achieve the same goal in terms
of segregation.
Under random allocation, the program has no impact on segregation and the plan-
ner does not fund any public housing in either neighborhood and there is indetermi-
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nacy in the choice of the neighborhood. Conversely, if the planner decides to imple-
ment a screening rule, a very simple condition on optimal neighborhood choice can be
given, under one additional assumption on the management of screening. The level
of screening is given by φH0 if public housing is funded in neighborhood 0 and by
φL1 if public housing is funded in neighborhood 1. Let us assume that φH0 = φL1 =
φ ∈ [0; min{φHmax0 ;φLmax1 }]. Such constraint means that the public housing agency in
charge of the allocation process is only able to enforce one simple screening rule at its
disposal, whether it is at the expense of type-H applicants in neighborhood 0 or at the
expense of type-L applicants in neighborhood 1. A general expression for the cost of the
program in neighborhood j is then cj (φ) = sj (φ) [pj (sj (φ))− k] and the expression for
the cost differential verifies c0(φ) > c1(φ) ⇔ n > α. This result can be summarized by
the following proposition:
Proposition 8 When facing the same screening rule in both neighborhoods, a planner will
choose to fund public housing in the better-quality neighborhood if and only if this neighbor-
hood is too small compared to the population of rich consumers.
proof: see Appendix A.7.
This is the other important result of the paper: in a city where high-quality neigh-
borhoods are in relative shortage compared to the number of wealthy residents, it is
more efficient to fund public housing in these high-quality neighborhoods. Think of the
two possible situations of total segregation in the city: all type-H consumers living in
0 or all type-L consumers living in 1. Proposition 8 states that if the former is in place,
then it is cheaper to move some type-H consumers into public housing in neighbor-
hood 1, where none of them lives, than to try and relocate type-L consumers into public
housing in neighborhood 0, where some of them already reside. The same reasoning
applies to intermediate situations. The comparison of n and α gives a measure of the
market relative capacity of answering the needs of the two social groups. If n > α, the
market answers the needs of the group of type-H more adequately and, as a result, the
public housing program must counterbalance this feature by locating where type-L are
overrepresented. In my numerical example, the chosen values for n and α are such that
public housing is funded in neighborhood 0.
3 Extensions
3.1 Endogenous neighborhood quality
Set-up– Up to now, I have considered that the degree of attractiveness of a neighborhood
was driven by the combination of two features, its size, or relative scarcity, and its qual-
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ity, taken as exogenous: this was the Fully Exogenous Quality case, henceforth FEXQ.
While it is possible to think of orderable exogenous neighborhood characteristics, such
as natural attributes, a neighborhood is also characterized by the social make-up of its
inhabitants. When talking about a ”good” or a ”bad” neighborhood, one generally in-
cludes a statement regarding the neighborhood’s level of wealth. To put it bluntly, it
may not be entirely realistic to assume that funding a large public housing complex
in a wealthy neighborhood and filling it with poor tenants may only have an upward
impact on prices of the private housing nearby. In this section, I investigate what can
be said about the impact of public housing policies when consumers account for the
externalities created by their neighbors in the valuation of their neighborhood.
One might want to consider two potentially conflicting external effects: peer effects
and network effects. Peer effects mean here that any consumer, regardless of her type,
prefers a neighborhood with a higher proportion of type-H residents. They are relevant
when one thinks of the quality of local public goods, especially schools. Network effects
mean that the valuation of the neighborhood by a consumer depends on his or her type
and increases with the proportion of residents of the same type who live in the neigh-
borhood. They are more relevant when economic status overlaps with other features,
such as immigration status.
With neighborhood externalities, the valuation of neighborhood quality becomes a
combination of an exogenous component (amenities) and an endogenous component
(social make-up). In order to keep the differences between the two types of households
to a minimum, I assume that the respective importance of these two components is
given by a type-independent scalar η. The expressions for the neighborhood valuation
are then given by vPEj if one considers peer effects and vNEij if one considers network
effects, with
vPEj = qj + η
α |xH − j|
nj
and vNEij = qj + η
αi |xi − j|
nj
, (9)
where qj is the same as before and xi is the position of the type-i indifferent consumer
between the two neighborhoods, which is determined at the equilibrium and is also
equal to the mass of type-i consumers who end up living in neighborhood 0.
I choose to focus on peer effects. This does not mean that network effects do not
exist, but I assume that their relative magnitude is probably small enough for them to
be neglected as a first-order approximation. Moreover, peer effects are far more relevant
to account for NIMBY-like behavior, such as coalitions of existing residents who oppose
public housing projects in their neighborhood for fear of a drop in neighborhood quality
and property values. Note that since neighborhood sizes are fixed, I could equivalently
consider that consumers put a negative weight on the proportion of type-L residents in
the neighborhood.
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I still focus on the situation which led to a fully asymmetric market equilibrium in
favor of neighborhood 0 in the absence of externalities, i.e. such that ∆q > 0 and n < 0.5.
Let pPEj (0) the market price in neighborhood j assuming consumers take the proportion
of type-H residents among their neighbors into account. I solve, in pPE0 (0), pPE1 (0),
xPEH (0) and x
PE
L (0), a four-equation system formed by a market-clearing equation, the
investors’ participation constraint and the two equations defining xPEH (0) and x
PE
L (0).
The price differential ∆pPE01 (0) ≡ pPE0 (0)− pPE1 (0) is now given by:
∆pPE01 (0) =
2n (1− n) t [∆q + t (1− 2n)]
2βˆn (1− n) t− ηα (1− α) (βL − βH) (10)
As for the new dissimilarity index DPE(0), it is given by the same function of ∆pPE01 (0)
as in equation 5. The complete expressions of pPE0 (0) and pPE1 (0) are provided in Ap-
pendix B.1. There is an existence condition to this equilibrium: η 6= η0, with η0 =
2βˆn(1−n)t/[α(1−α)(βL−βH)]. However, another condition on η is in fact more restric-
tive than this existence condition. Recall that the dissimilarity index cannot be larger
than the size of the smaller of the two groups of consumers. This yields two threshold
values ηα (if α < 1/2) and η1−α if (α > 1/2), which are both lower than η0 (for complete
expressions, see Appendix B.1). Under the condition η ≤ maxi=H,L {ηαi} , it is always
verified that ∆p01 (0) < ∆pPE01 (0): the introduction of the externality exacerbates the
polarization of the city.
The impact of public housing under peer effects– One may wonder if the introduction
of externalities is enough to alter the previous result that random allocation of public
housing under FEXQ cannot reduce the level of segregation in the city. I focus on ex
ante allocation and show that the expressions for the price differentials ∆pPEγ (sj) =
pPEγ (sj) − pPEγ (0) are similar to what is obtained under FEXQ (for complete expres-
sions, see Appendix B.2). The consumers who are indifferent between living in either
of the two neighborhoods stay unchanged, regardless of the size of the public hous-
ing program, and segregation remains at its market level. Since there is no screening
of applicants, the population of public tenants does not alter the social make-up of the
neighborhood, hence the endogenous component of neighborhood valuation does not
affect the equilibrium. The only change with respect to Section 2 is about the cost of the
program: the private market price is higher (resp., lower) in neighborhood 0 (resp., in
neighborhood 1) than under FEXQ.
Introducing the screening of applicants under endogenous neighborhood quality
has both a direct effect on the social make-up of the public housing complex, and an
indirect effect on the quality of the neighborhood. As a result, public housing policy
will be more efficient. By ”efficient”, I mean that the same reduction in the level of
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segregation will require a smaller public housing program, for any level of screening.
I solve a similar problem as in Subsection 2.2: after getting the equilibrium as a func-
tion ofφj , I solve the system formed by the public housing market clearing equation and
the equation giving the planner’s goal in terms of segregation. This yields the solutions
φi
PE
j (φ
−i
j , η) and s
PE
j (φ
−i
j , η). The functions φ
iPE
j (φ
−i
j , η) are exactly the same as under
FEXQ. As for the functions sPEj (φ
−i
j , η), they give the optimal size of the public housing
program needed to reach the goal δ. Then, the final step is to compare sPEj (φ
−i
j , η) and
sj(φ
−i
j ) and show that s
PE
j (φ
−i
j , η) < sj(φ
−i
j ). This yields the following proposition:
Proposition 9 The minimum size of the public housing program required to reduce segregation
by a fixed fraction is lower when taking the impact of neighborhood externalities into account.
Proof: see Appendix B.3.
Using the same numerical example as in Section 2, one finds η0 ≈ 1.28. The maxi-
mum value of η for which the problem is still meaningful solves DPE (0) = α. This is
obtained for η = ηα ≈ 0.54. Prices pPEj (0) are now between p∗0 (0) ≈ 3.7 and p∗1 (0) ≈ 2.5
(for η = 0) and extreme values pPE0 (0) ≈ 4.2 and pPE1 (0) ≈ 2.2 when η = ηα. By defi-
nition of ηα, market segregation goes from D (0) = 0.26 for η = 0 to DPE (0) = 0.45 for
η = ηα. The value of total welfare goes from W (0) = 3.7 to W PE (0) = 4.1, the weighted
average between W PEH (0) = 5.6 and W
PE
L (0) = 2.8. When η > 0, the condition under
which neighborhood 0 is chosen over neighborhood 1 is more complicated than in the
exogenous case and may depend on δ (complete expression is provided in Appendix
B.4). However, in the numerical example, neighborhood 0 is chosen for any value of δ
and φ, since the maximum value of the difference between the cost of the program in
neighborhood 0 and the cost of the program in neighborhood 1 is equal to−0.315, value
reached for φ = 0 and δ = 1.
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of externalities on the minimum program size sPE0
(
φH0 , η
)
required to reduce segregation by 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%. The black lines, which
correspond to the FEXQ case (η = 0), are the same as in Figure (1). The red lines with
squares, which are referenced by the superscript PE in order to be clearly distinguished
from the regular lines, describe the other polar case when η = ηα, i.e. when neighbor-
hood valuation is largely driven by its endogenous component. One can check that
the red lines with squares are always below the black lines, except for δ = δPE = 1,
when they are confounded. Indeed, when there is no segregation at all, the endogenous
component of neighborhood valuation does not impact location decisions.
While peer effects increase the polarization of the city, they also increase the effi-
ciency of the public housing policy: reducing segregation by the same factor δ will
require fewer public resources, or a lower level of screening, than in the FEXQ case.
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Figure 3: Optimal public housing share in neighborhood 0 as a function of the level of
acceptance of type-H applicants, without and with externalities
The black lines correspond to the FEXQ case. The red lines with squares correspond
to the case where the relative importance of peer effects in consumers’ valuation of
a neighborhood is maximum.
Figure 4 illustrates this by comparing the relative optimal decreases in segregation
δ∗(φ,G, η) when η = 0 and η = ηα as a function of combinations of (φ,G), using the
same parametrization as before when public housing is funded in neighborhood 0.
Except when the program is overfunded and segregation goes down to zero (the
top-left corner of the figure), it is always the case that δ∗(φ,G, ηα) > δ∗(φ,G, 0), for any
combination (φ,G) where φ < 1 and G > 0. The relative distance between δ∗(φ,G, ηα)
and δ∗(φ,G, 0) increases when φ → 1 and G → 0: in case the program is both small in
magnitude and tends to random allocation, the presence of neighborhood externalities
makes it all the more efficient.
3.2 Indirect screening
Whereas public housing agencies may not be allowed to directly screen applicants be-
cause the political cost would be too high, there are no reasons to think that public
housing units may not be designed such that they are only attractive for a certain type
of consumers. This will be the case if a housing unit is not only defined by its location
but also by other characteristics -such as its size and its comfort, and if these additional
characteristics are not valued equally by both types of consumers. For example, it is
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Figure 4: Comparison of δ = δ∗
(
φH0 , G, 0
)
and δPE = δ∗
(
φH0 , G, ηα
)
as a function of
public resources and the level of acceptance of type-H applicants
possible to imagine that only richer households will value certain dwelling patterns,
such as space for representation. Similarly, the assumption that everyone, regardless of
type, consumes one unit of housing, may also hide an indirect screening channel based
on the size distribution of public housing units. If public housing units, even in a good
location, mostly attract poor households, the policy will reduce segregation, and all the
more so if externalities then exacerbate this initial differential.
One can easily amend the model to incorporate these features. Consider that the
characteristics of the dwelling may be summarized by an orderable index, independent
of location, equal to F if the unit is private and to f if it is public, with F > f . The
assumption that F > f may only reflect the fact that the level of mismatch is higher in
public housing, whereas there is a continuum of possible combinations in the private
market which makes it easier for households to find a dwelling more adapted to their
needs. The expressions for the neighborhood valuation are now given by vij , with
vij =
{
qj + 
iF if the unit is private
qj + 
if if the unit is public
. (11)
where qj is the same as before and i > 0 measures the relative importance of comfort
characteristics with respect to location.
Assume that H > L, ie richer households are more sensitive to the intrinsic charac-
teristics of their dwelling. A public housing program funded in neighborhood 0, where
s0 units are randomly allocated to both types of applicants, will reduce segregation
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down to a level of dissimilarity D(s0) defined by:
D(s0) = D(0)− α(1− α)(β
LH − βHL)
βˆnt
(F − f)s0 (12)
Since βL > βH and H > L, one can check that, indeed, D(s0) < D(0). Assume further
that f is a policy parameter, whereas F is exogenously determined by the construction
sector. Provided public housing agencies are able to set f low enough, they will only
attract type-L applicants, and the program will be as able to reduce segregation as a
program with direct screening. In that sense, an equivalence relationship between f
and φ can be found.
However, despite how attractively simple this indirect screening channel may seem,
it is far from obvious that it is relevant, for at least two reasons. First, from a theoretical
viewpoint, the assumption that H > L may strike as completely ad-hoc: whereas it de-
rives from the marginal utility of income that βL > βH , this is not the case of this latter
assumption. Moreover, even if it is likely that richer consumers are pickier regarding
the comfort of their dwelling, one must ensure that this difference stands true relative to
their valuation of neighborhood quality qj , which is unclear. The second problem of the
indirect screening channel is a practical one: leaving aside the question of the observ-
ability of i, how can agencies set a value of f such that they reach their goal in terms
of reduction of segregation? if, for example, it is by letting public housing buildings de-
teriorate, or by allowing the production of low-quality public housing buildings, why
would this strategy be more politically feasible, especially in wealthy neighborhoods,
than directly screening applicants? On the contrary, for external political reasons, what
should be most likely observed is a positive correlation between qj and f ; and in that
case, the indirect screening channel will increase segregation.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that implementing public housing quotas do not always
reduce segregation. In a context of very constrained city size, when public housing units
come from preexisting housing stock, public housing quotas will be effective if and only
if a minimum level of screening is enforced at the expense of the applicants whose kind
is already overrepresented in the neighborhoods where public housing is funded. The
final message to be drawn from this model then depends on whether public authorities
are able, either politically or technically, to impose this kind of screening.
Since the main alternative to public housing programs is housing vouchers, it would
seem natural to try and compare the impact of the two policies. However, because in-
come is not modeled explicitly, vouchers will here be assimilated to gross utility trans-
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fers, conditional on people living in the targeted neighborhood. Such conditional utility
transfer policy may prove more efficient if consumers are less sensitive to housing prices
than to the price of other goods; moreover, and somewhat more importantly, if those
transfers are fully divisible, this policy will not suffer from the potential inefficiencies
induced by rationing.
There are several possible extensions to this simple framework. First of all, total
housing supply is not always fixed and a city-planner may often choose whether pub-
lic housing should come from existing stock or be created ex nihilo; in this case, public
housing programs will increase the city population and possibly change its social make-
up. If included, this feature would allow to investigate the political economy behind
public housing programs. In particular, if the planner has to seek reelection, there are
incentives for her to buy votes with housing. Such a model might help understand the
patterns of apparently exogenous increases in the population of some cities, for instance
in the Paris region in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Another interesting extension in terms of po-
litical economy would be to no longer assume that investors perfectly anticipate future
public housing programs when they make their investment decision and are subject to
a hold-up problem. I leave this for future work.
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A Analytical expressions from Section 2
A.1 Covered-market condition
I provide here a sufficient condition for the market to be covered under exogenous neighborhood
quality. I focus on i = L, because, provided both types have the same level of reservation utility,
if the market is covered for type-L consumers, then it is also covered for type-H consumers. Let
Umin the reservation utility that consumers would get outside the market. If the market is not
covered, this means that ∀j = 0, 1, ∃x ∈ [0, 1], ULj (x) < Umin. I derive the implications of these
inequalities and provide a condition under which they cannot be verified. We have:{
q0 − βLp0 − tx < Umin
q1 − βLp1 − t (1− x) < Umin
⇒
{
x >
(
q0 − βLp0 − Umin
)
/t
x < 1− (q1 − βLp1 − Umin) /t (13)
As a consequence, a sufficient condition for the market to be covered is the following:
1− (q1 − βLp1 − Umin)/t < (q0 − βLp0 − Umin)/t, (14)
which can also be written as:
1
2
[
UL0
(
1
2
)
+ UL1
(
1
2
)]
> Umin (15)
The expected utility of the median type-L consumer entering the market with equiprobability
to live in either neighborhood must be positive. This can always be achieved by setting qj high
enough.
A.2 Welfare in the private city
The expressions q¯, p¯ and t¯ are the following:
q¯ =
∑
j=0,1
njqj (16)
p¯ =
∑
i=H,L
αiβ
i [x∗i (0) p
∗
0 (0) + (1− x∗i (0)) p∗1 (0)] (17)
t¯ =
t
2
∑
i=H,L
αi [1− 2 (x∗i (0)) (1− (x∗i (0)))] (18)
The complete expression for welfare is:
W (0) =
1
4βˆ2t

4ct
[
α3
(
βL − βH)3 − (βL)3]
+α (1− α) (βL − βH)2 {[∆q + t (1− 2n)]2 + 12βLct}
+12αct
(
βH
(
βL
)2 − βL (βH)2)
+2βˆ2t {nq0 + (1− n) q1 − t [1− 2n (1− n)]}

(19)
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From Equation (19), I can compute the following expressions for the comparative statics for
W (0):
∂W (0)
∂c
= −βˆ (20)
∂W (0)
∂q0
= n+ α (1− α) (βL − βH)2 [∆q + t (1− 2n)] /(2tβˆ2) (21)
∂W (0)
∂q1
= 1− n− α (1− α) (βL − βH)2 [∆q + t (1− 2n)] /(2tβˆ2) (22)
∂W (0)
∂t
= − 1(
2tβˆ
)2
{
α (1− α) (βL − βH)2 [(∆q)2 − t2 (1− 2n)2]
+βˆ2t2 [1− 2n (1− n)]
}
(23)
When I consider separately the welfare of each group of consumer, I get the following:
∂WL (0)
∂βH
= −α2βL (βL − βH) [∆q + t (1− 2n)]2 /(2tβˆ3) (24)
∂WH (0)
∂βL
= (1− α)2 βH (βL − βH) [∆q + t (1− 2n)]2 /(2tβˆ3) (25)
∂WL (0)
∂α
= αβL
(
βL − βH)2 [∆q + t (1− 2n)]2 /(2tβˆ3) (26)
∂WH (0)
∂α
= − (1− α)βH (βL − βH)2 [∆q + t (1− 2n)]2 /(2tβˆ3) (27)
∂WL (0)
∂n
= βL
[
βL − 2α (βL − βH)] [∆q + t (1− 2n)] /βˆ2 (28)
∂WH (0)
∂n
= βH
[
βH + 2 (1− α) (βL − βH)] [∆q + t (1− 2n)] /βˆ2 (29)
A.3 Optimality
The first-best allocation of the population is distinct from the market allocation. The allocation
of the population that would maximize the welfare of consumers is given by the consumers
(x˜H , x˜L) , who represent the consumers who live in neighborhood 0 and are the furthest on the
right of the [0, 1] segment, and the prices (p˜0, p˜1). Given the two constraints αx˜H+(1− α) x˜L = n
and np˜0+(1− n) p˜1 = c, finding the first-best allocation amounts to finding a pair (x˜∗H , p˜∗0) which
maximizes
W˜ (x˜H , p˜0) =
∫ x˜H
0
[
q0 − βHp0 − tx
]
dx+
∫ 1
x˜H
[
q1 − βH
(
c− np0
1− n
)
− t (1− x)
]
dx (30)
+
∫ n−αx˜H
1−α
0
[
q0 − βLp0 − tx
]
dx+
∫ 1
n−αx˜H
1−α
[
q1 − βL
(
c− np0
1− n
)
− t (1− x)
]
dx
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under the constraints p˜0 ∈ [0, c/n] and x˜H ∈
[
max
{
n−(1−α)
α , 0
}
,min
{
n
α , 1
}]
. A simple way to
rewrite W˜ (x˜H , p˜0) is:
W˜ (x˜H , p˜0) = W
No +
α
(1− α) (1− n) (x˜H − n)
[
(1− α) (βL − βH) (p˜0 − c)− t (1− n) (x˜H − n)]
(31)
Note that the function W˜ (x˜H , p˜0) is not concave and the maximization problem will yield corner
solutions, ie, total segregation.
Using the same numerical example as in sections 2 and 3, one finds that W˜ ∗ = W˜ (x˜∗H , p˜
∗
0) is
obtained for the maximum value of x˜∗H = n/α = 0.89 and for p˜
∗
0 = 7.5. In that case, W˜
∗ = 4.94,
whereas W (0) = 3.72 and WNo = 3.66.
A.4 Allocation process
The market clearing equation and the free entry condition for ex ante allocation are given by:
n =
∑
i=H,L
αixi
(
Eip˜0 (sj) ;E
ip˜1 (sj)
)
(32)
c =
∑
k=0,1
nkpk (sj) (33)
The market clearing equations for ex post allocation are given by:
n =
∑
i=H,L
αi
[
xi (p0 (s0) ; p1 (s0)) + Pr
i
0 〈xi (k; p1 (s0))− xi (p0 (s0) ; p1 (s0))〉
]
(34)
n =
∑
i=H,L
αi
[
xi (k; p0 (s1)) +
(
1− Pri1
) 〈xi (p0 (s1) ; p1 (s1))− xi (p0 (s1) ; k)〉] (35)
A.5 Prices and segregation under random allocation
A.5.1 Pricing under ex ante location choice
The expressions for the ∆paγ (sj) are the following:
∆paj (sj) =
sjn−j
nj − sjn−j
[
p∗j (0)− k
]
and ∆pa−j (sj) = −
sjnj
nj − sjn−j
[
p∗j (0)− k
]
(36)
Since nj − sjn−j > 0, one can then immediately check that ∆paj (sj) > 0 and ∆pa−j (sj) < 0.
A.5.2 Pricing under ex post location choice
Under ex post allocation, the probability Prij is proportional to the stock of public housing in
the neighborhood and inversely proportional to the number of applicants Aj > nj . Since Aj
is endogenous, it also depends on prices and the market clearing equation is of degree 2. The
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relevance of the two pairs of solutions depends on the parameter space. I hereby provide the
analytical expressions for one of them.
Let Z (s0) = βˆ (p∗0 (0)− k) + 2t [n+ s0 (1− n)] and Y (s0) = 8ns0tβˆ (p∗0 (0)− k). Assuming
(Z(s0))
2 > Y (s0), the relevant pair of solutions for public housing in 0 yields the following:
∆pp0 (s0) =
1− n
2nβˆ
(
Z (s0)−
√
(Z (s0))
2 − Y (s0)
)
(37)
∆pp1 (s0) = −
1
2βˆ
(
Z (s0)−
√
(Z (s0))
2 − Y (s0)
)
(38)
Since Z (s0) > 0 and Y (s0) > 0, one can then immediately check that ∆p
p
0 (s0) > 0 and
∆pp1 (s0) < 0.
Let Z (s1) = βˆ (p∗1 (0)− k) + 2t [1− n+ s1n] and Y (s1) = 8 (1− n) s1tβˆ (p∗1 (0)− k) . Assum-
ing (Z(s1))2 > Y (s1), the relevant pair of solutions for public housing in 1 yields the following:
∆pp0 (s1) = −
1
2βˆ
(
Z (s1)−
√
(Z (s1))
2 − Y (s1)
)
(39)
∆pp1 (s1) =
n
2 (1− n) βˆ
(
Z (s1)−
√
(Z (s1))
2 − Y (s1)
)
(40)
Since Z (s1) > 0 and Y (s1) > 0, one can then immediately check that ∆p
p
0 (s1) < 0 and
∆pp1 (s1) > 0.
A.5.3 Segregation index
I compute the dissimilarity indexes after the program is implemented and show that ∀ (j, pi) ∈
{0, 1} × {a, p} , Dpi (sj) = D (0). For ex ante location, we have : ∀j = 0, 1
Da (sj) = α
[
xH
(
Eip˜a0 (sj) ;E
ip˜a1 (sj)
)− n] (41)
+ (1− α) [n− xL (Eip˜a0 (sj) ;Eip˜a1 (sj)])
Under equiprobability, ∀ (i, j) ∈ {H,L}×{0, 1} , Eip˜aj (sj) = sjnj k+
nj−sj
nj
paj (sj). Straightforward
computations show that xi
(
Eip˜a0 (sj) ;E
ip˜a1 (sj)
)
= xi (p
∗
0 (0) , p
∗
1 (0)). For ex post location, we
have:
Dp (s0) = α
{
PrH0 xH (k; p
p
1 (s0))− n
+
(
1− PrH0
)
xH (p
p
0 (s0) ; p
p
1 (s0))
}
(42)
+ (1− α)
{
1− xL (k; pp1 (s0))− (1− n)
+
(
1− PrL0
)
(xLk; p
p
1 (s0))− xL (pp0 (s0) ; pp1 (s0)))
}
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Dp (s1) = α
{
xH (p0 (s1) ; k)− n
+
(
1− PrH1
)
(xH (p
p
0 (s1) ; p
p
1 (s1))− xH (p0 (s1) ; k))
}
(43)
+ (1− α)
{
1− xL (pp0 (s1) ; pp1 (s1))− (1− n)
+ PrL1 (xL (p
p
0 (s1) ; p
p
1 (s1))− xL (pp0 (s1) ; k))
}
Under equiprobability, ∀i ∈ {H,L} ,
i
Pr
0
= s0/ [αxH (k; p
p
1 (s0)) + (1− α)xL (k; pp1 (s0))] (44)
and
i
Pr
1
= s1/ [α (1− xH (p0 (s1) ; k)) + (1− α) (1− xL (p0 (s1) ; k))] . (45)
Simplifying Dp (sj) is computationally more burdensome but it leads to the same conclusion
that ∀j = 0, 1, Dp (sj) = D (0) .
A.6 The effects of screening public housing applicants
A.6.1 Constraints
The constraints under which Equation (8) is solved are the following:
n =
∑
i=H,L
αixi
(
Eip˜0
(
sj , φ
i
j
)
;Eip˜1
(
sj , φ
i
j
))
(46)
nj =
∑
i=H,L
φijαi
∣∣xi (Eip˜0 (sj , φij) ;Eip˜1 (sj , φij))− j∣∣ (47)
A.6.2 The trade-off between screening and program size
In this section, I prove proposition 7 on the trade-off between the level of screening in the alloca-
tion of public housing and the size of the program. In analytical terms, this proposition derives
from the following inequalities and equivalence relationships:
∂φij
(
φ−ij
)
/∂φ−ij ≤ 0, (48)
φij ≤ 1⇔ φ−ij
(
φij
) ≥ 1, (49)[
∂sj
(
φij
)
/∂φij ≥ 0 and φij ≤ 1
]⇔ [∂sj (φij) /∂φ−ij (φij) ≤ 0 and φ−ij (φij) ≥ 1] , (50)
I focus on the case where public housing is introduced in the better neighborhood since the
computations would be almost identical in the other case. I show that ∂s0
(
φH0
)
/∂φH0 ≥ 0 and
conversely, that ∂s0
(
φH0
)
/∂φL0 ≤ 0. For this purpose, I first solve for equilibrium private market
prices, as a function of φ0. I find:
p1 (s0,φ0) =
βˆcn− (c− kn) s0
(
αβHφH0 + (1− α)βLφL0
)− n2 [∆q + t (1− 2n)]
βˆn− (1− n) s0
(
αβHφH0 + (1− α)βLφL0
)
αβH
(51)
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p0 (s0,φ0) = p
a
1 (s0,φ0) +
n [∆q + t (1− 2n)] + (c− k) s0
[
αβHφH0 + (1− α)βLφL0
]
βˆn− (1− n) s0
(
αβHφH0 + (1− α)βLφL0
)
αβH
(52)
Then, I consider the system formed by equations (47) and (8). For clarity purposes, I introduce
a variable ξ0 which represents by how much type-H tenants will be over-represented in neigh-
borhood 0 and I replace equation (8) by the following:
xH
(
EH p˜a0 (s0,φ0) ;E
H p˜1 (s0,φ0)
)
= (1 + ξ0)n (53)
The problem is equivalent to the previous one as soon as ξ0 = (1− δ)D (0) / (2nα). Restrictions
on ξ0 are the following: first, I assume that the policy will never lead to type-H being under-
represented in neighborhood 0; in other words, ξ0 ≥ 0. Second, the number of type-H ready to
enter neighborhood 0 must be lower than the total number of spots in neighborhood 0:
αxH
(
EH p˜0 (s0,φ0) ;E
H p˜1 (s0,φ0)
) ≤ n⇐⇒ ξ0 ≤ (1− α) /α (54)
Finally, the policy is supposed to reduce segregation. This will be the case as soon as
ξ0 ≤ D (0)
2nα
= (1− α) (βL − βH) [∆q + t (1− 2n)] /(2βˆnt) (55)
I solve the system (47),(53)) in φL0
(
φH0
)
and s0
(
φH0
)
. This yields the following solutions:
φL0
(
φH0
)
= 1 +
α (1 + ξ0)
(
1− φH0
)
1− α (1 + ξ0) (56)
s0
(
φH0
)
=
A0
B0 − C0φH0
(57)
with:
A0 = n [1− α (1 + ξ0)]
{
(1− α) (βL − βH) [∆q + t (1− 2n)]− 2βˆntξ0} (58)
B0 = (1− α)βL
{
βH (c− k) + (1− n) [∆q + t (1− 2n (1 + ξ0))]
}
(59)
C0 = (1− n) (1 + ξ0)α
{
(1− α) (βL − βH) [∆q + t (1− 2n)]− 2βˆntξ0} (60)
+βH (1− n)
{
(1− α) [∆q + t (1− 2n)] + α
(
2βˆntξ0
)}
+ βHβL (1− α) (c− k)
Expression 48 is established by Equation (56) under condition (54). As far as Expression 49, given
conditions (54) and (55), it is straightforward to verify that A0 ≥ 0, B0 > 0 and C0 > 0. Conse-
quently, we have ∂s0
(
φH0
)
/∂φH0 = A0C0/
(
B0 − C0φH0
)2 ≥ 0. Conversely, ∂s0 (φH0 ) /∂φL0 (φH0 ) ≤
0. One can check that s0
(
φH0
)
is well-defined for all possible values of φH0 , since B0 − C0 =
{(1−α)(βL−βH)[∆q+ t(1−2n)]−2βˆntξ0}(1−n)[1−α(1+ ξ0)] > 0. However, A0/ (B0 − C0) =
n
(1−n) > 1, which is impossible. The minimum level of screening is defined by φ
Hmax
0 such that
s0
(
φHmax0
)
= n. This will be the case when φHmax0 = 1−A0/C0. This proves Expression 50.
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A.7 The planner’s decision
The cost c0
(
φH0
)
= s0
(
φH0
) [
p0
(
s0
(
φH0
))− k] of the public housing program in neighborhood 0
simplifies to:
c0
(
φH0
)
=
A0
(1− α) (1− φH0 )βLβH (61)
and it does not depend on k. The cost of the public housing program in neighborhood 1 is
obtained similarly, this time using φL1 as a parameter, with ξ1 =
(1−δ)D(0)
2(1−n)(1−α) ≤ α1−α and
A1 = (1− n) [α− (1− α) ξ0]
{
α
(
βL − βH) [∆q + t (1− 2n)]− 2βˆ (1− n) tξ1} (62)
This yields
c1
(
φL1
)
=
A1
α
(
1− φL1
)
βLβH
(63)
If I consider that the same level of screening must be enforced against type-H applicants in
neighborhood 0 and against type-L applicants in neighborhood 1, I can therefore directly com-
pare these two costs, as a function of φ = φH0 = φ
L
1 . Straightforward computations lead to the
following expression of the cost differential:
c0 (φ)− c1 (φ) =
δ
(
βL − βH) [∆q + t (1− 2n)]
(1− φ)βLβH (n− α) (64)
which proves Proposition 7.
To search for δ∗ (G), I then solve equation cj∗ (φ) = G in δ. This yields two solutions
δinf (G) =
Φj∗ − Ω−
√
(Ω− Φj∗)2 + 4ΩG
2Ω
(65)
δsup (G) =
Φj∗ − Ω +
√
(Ω− Φj∗)2 + 4ΩG
2Ω
(66)
with
Φ0 =
nβˆD (0) t
α (1− φ)βLβH (67)
Φ1 =
(1− n) βˆD (0) t
(1− α) (1− φ)βLβH (68)
Ω =
βˆD (0) t
2α (1− α) (1− φ)βLβH (69)
Since Φ0 > 0, Φ1 > 0 and Ω > 0, the solution δinf (G) is negative and can be ruled out. The
other solution δsup is positive. A necessary and sufficient condition on G for δsup (G) < 1 is
G ≤ Gmax = 2Ω− Φj∗ . If G > Gmax, δ∗ (G) = 1.
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B Analytical expressions from Section 3
B.1 Private market Equilibrium
The expressions for the market prices under endogenous neighborhood quality are the follow-
ing:
pPE1 (0) = c−
2 (1− n)n2t [∆q + t (1− 2n)]
2βˆ (1− n)nt− ηα (1− α) (βL − βH) (70)
pPE0 (0) = c+
2 (1− n)2 nt [∆q + t (1− 2n)]
2βˆ (1− n)nt− ηα (1− α) (βL − βH) (71)
The expressions for ηα and η1−α verify:
ηα = η0 − 2n (1− n) [∆q + t (1− 2n)] /α (72)
η1−α = η0 − 2n (1− n) [∆q + t (1− 2n)] / (1− α) (73)
B.2 Equilibrium with no screening of applicants
The expressions for the market prices under endogenous neighborhood quality when public
housing is allocated at random verify:
∆pPEj (sj) =
sjn−j
nj − sjn−j
[
pPEj (0)− k
]
(74)
∆pPE−j (sj) = −
sjnj
nj − sjn−j
[
pPEj (0)− k
]
(75)
B.3 The snowball effects of screening
I provide here the expressions for public housing in neighborhood 0, but similar expressions
could be given for public housing in neighborhood 1 as well. I solve a system similar to ((47),(53))
in φL
PE
0
(
φH0
)
and sPE0
(
φH0
)
. This yields the following solutions:
φL
PE
0
(
φH0
)
= 1 +
α
(
1 + ξPE0
) (
1− φH0
)
1− α (1 + ξPE0 ) (76)
sPE0
(
φH0
)
=
APE0
BPE0 − CPE0 φH0
(77)
with
APE0 = n
[
1− α (1 + ξPE0 )]
{
(1− α) (βL − βH) {(1− n) [∆q + t (1− 2n)]}
+
{
α (1− α) (βL − βH) η − 2βˆn (1− n) t} ξPE0
}
(78)
BPE0 = (1− α)βL (1− n)
{
βH (c− k) + (1− n) [∆q + t (1− 2n)]
+ {αη − 2n (1− n) t} ξPE0
}
(79)
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CPE0 = (1− n)

βH
 β
L (1− α) (c− k)
+
[
1− α (1 + ξPE0 )]
[
(1− α) (1− n) [∆q + t (1− 2n)]
+α
[
(1− α) η + 2n (1− n) tξPE0
] ]

+α (1− α)βL (1 + ξPE0 )
{
(1− n) [∆q + t (1− 2n)]
+ {αη − 2n (1− n) t} ξPE0
}

(80)
Once again, it is straightforward to verify that APE0 ≥ 0, BPE0 > 0, CPE0 > 0, hence, ∂sPE0 (φH0 )
/∂φH0 ≥ 0. In addition, since ξPE0 < DPE (0) / (2nα), we have ∀φH0 ∈ [0, 1] , BPE0 − CPE0 φH0 >
0 and sPE0
(
φH0
)
is well-defined for all values of φH0 . The snowball effects will be established if
∀φH0 ∈ [0, 1] , sPE0
(
φH0
) ≤ s0 (φH0 ). I proceed as follows: I first use that sPE0 (1) = s0(1). Indeed,
sPE0 (1) = s0 (1) =
n
1− n (81)
This equality leads to
APE0 B0 −A0BPE0 = APE0 C0 −A0CPE0 (82)
I then show that ∀η ∈ [0, η1 (0)] ,
APE0 B0 −A0BPE0 ≤ 0 (83)
Indeed, we have
APE0 B0 −A0BPE0 = −
Θ0
Ξ0
(84)
with
Θ0 = η (1− α)4 α
(
βL − βH)2 βL (1− δ) δ (1− n) [∆q + t (1− 2n)]2 (85)
×{2βH (1− n)nt+ α (βL − βH) [βH (c− k) + δ (1− n) [∆q + t (1− 2n)]]}
which is always positive, and
Ξ0 = 2βˆt
[
2βˆn (1− n) t− ηα (1− α) (βL − βH)] (86)
which is positive as soon as η ≤ η (0). This inequality leads to
APE0 B0 −A0BPE0 < φH0
(
APE0 C0 −A0CPE0
)
(87)
hence, with B0 − C0 > 0 and BPE0 − CPE0 > 0, we get that:
sPE0
(
φH0
) ≤ s0 (φH0 ) (88)
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B.4 Neighborhood choice
The cost differential under screening and endogenous neighborhood valuation is such that:
∆c01 (φ, η) > 0⇔
α{2βˆ (1− n)nt− ηα (1− α) (βL − βH)}
×{2βˆ (1− n)ntδ + ηα (1− α) (βL − βH) (1− δ)}
×
{
α (1− α) (βL − βH) (1− δ) ∆q
−t{βˆ [1 + δ (1− 2n)] + βH (1− δ) (1− 2n)}
}
(89)
> 4 (1− α) βˆ2δ (1− n)n2t2
×
{
α
(
βL − βH) [η (1− a) + (1− δ) ∆q (1− n)]
+ (1− n) t [2βLn − α (βL − βH) (1− δ (1− 2n))]
}
.
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C Additional figures
Figure 5: Optimal share of public housing in neighborhood 1 as a function of the level
of acceptance of type-L applicants
Figure 6: Optimal level of segregation when public housing funded in neighborhood 1
as a function of the level of acceptance of type-L applicants
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